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Abstract
We describe a distributed partial order reduction algorithm for security protocols. Some experimental
results using an implementation of the algorithm in the distributed μCRL toolset are also reported.
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1 Introduction
We have recently developed a partial order reduction (POR) technique for model
checking security protocols, fully described in [8]. The algorithm is based on
breadth-ﬁrst exploration and preserves LTL−X properties. In this paper we report
on extending our POR algorithm to a distributed setting.
In the following, we ﬁrst brieﬂy describe the POR algorithm of [8] for security
protocols. Next, we adapt the algorithm to a distributed setting, resulting in, as
we call it, DPOR, which we present in pseudo-code. Some experimental results
and discussions on eﬀectiveness and scalability of DPOR are reported in section 5.
Our implementation of DPOR is available at http://www.cwi.nl/∼mcrl/. Finally,
section 6 concludes the paper with our future and related work.
2 Preliminaries
Labelled transition systems (LTS) An LTS is a tuple (Σ, s0,Act ,Tr), where
Σ is a set of states, s0 ∈ Σ is the initial state, Act is a set of actions and Tr ⊆
Σ×Act×Σ is the transition relation. We write s a−→s′ when (s, a, s′) ∈ Tr . The set
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of enabled actions in state s is en(s) = {a ∈ Act | ∃s′ ∈ Σ. s a−→ s′}. For A ⊆ Act ,
let nxt(s,A) = {s′ ∈ Σ | ∃a ∈ A. s a−→ s′}.
Security protocols We model a security protocol as a ﬁnite number of pro-
cesses and an asynchronous communication subsystem. The set of honest processes
is P , and one single intruder process models all malicious participants and, more-
over, controls the communication channels. We consider the Dolev-Yao intruder
model [7]. Each process p ∈ P is modelled as a ﬁnite, acyclic and uniquely named
LTS. As security protocols normally have only ﬁnite runs, our POR algorithm aims
at cycle-free state spaces. To interact with the communication subsystem, a process
p ∈ P uses actions sendp(m) and recvp(m), in which message m is produced and
consumed, respectively. Apart from these two actions, all other actions of processes
are assumed internal, i.e. not interacting with the communication subsystem. An
internal action is called invisible if it does not appear in the properties being ver-
iﬁed. Else, it is called visible. We assume that all internal actions of process p
contain p as a subscript, e.g. secretp(m) can be an internal action of p performed
when p concludes that m is a secret. The set of actions of a process can thus be
partitioned into four disjoint sets: Actp = Vp ∪ Ip ∪ Sp ∪ Rp, with Vp and Ip de-
noting the set of visible and the set of invisible internal actions of p, respectively,
Sp = {sendp} and Rp = {recvp}. Since all these actions are sub-scripted, we have
∀p, q ∈ P. p = q =⇒ Actp ∩ Actq = ∅. We write V = ∪p∈PVp, and similarly for I,
S and R. As Act = ∪p∈PActp, we have Act = V ∪ I ∪ S ∪R.
3 POR for security protocols
Algorithm 1 shows our POR algorithm for security protocols. The idea is that send
and invisible internal actions can be prioritised over other actions. Moreover, if one
action of process p is explored at state s, then all other actions of Actp∩ en(s) have
to be explored at s as well. See [8] for a detailed presentation of why this algorithm
works.
We deﬁne the projection function π : Act → P as π(a) = p, if a = ap(m), ap ∈
Actp. We deﬁne the relation ∼⊆ Act × Act as ∀a, a
′ ∈ Act . a ∼ a′ ⇐⇒ π(a) =
π(a′). The relation ∼ is an equivalence, and thus partitions Act into equivalence
classes such that each class contains only actions performed by one particular pro-
cess. The set of all equivalence classes in A ⊆ Act given the equivalence relation ∼
is denoted A/∼. For A ⊆ Act , we let V(A) = A ∩ V and R = A ∩R.
Note that the purpose of using the Expanded set is to avoid state revisits, and it
is not needed to guarantee the termination of the algorithm as the LTSs are cycle
free. Therefore, this set can gradually be removed from memory and be stored on
disks, in case memory limits are reached, without endangering the termination of
the algorithm. For similar approaches to memory management see [3,9].
M. Torabi Dashti et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 198 (2008) 93–9994
Algorithm 1 POR for security protocols
Current := {s0}
Expanded := ∅ //used for duplicate detection, in case conﬂuent traces exist
while Current \ Expanded = ∅ do
Next := ∅
for all s ∈ Current \ Expanded do
Construct en(s)/∼ and name its elements as c1, . . . , c.
T := {ci | i ∈ {1, . . . , },V(ci) ∪ R(ci) = ∅}
if T = ∅ then
Pick the smallest c ∈ T
Next := Next ∪ nxt(s, c)
else if T = ∅ then
Next := Next ∪ nxt(s, en(s))
end if
end for
Expanded := Expanded ∪ Current
Current := Next
end while
4 DPOR: Distributed POR for security protocols
As is evident from the pseudo-code of algorithm 1, when expanding state s, the
decision to prune (some of its outgoing transitions) depends solely on en(s) and can
therefore be made locally. This implies that in a distributed implementation, no
extra communication is needed for the POR pruning part.
Distributed state space generation algorithms usually comprise the code ran by
each client and the code for a manager process. In algorithm 2, we show the part of
our DPOR algorithm which is ran by the clients. The manager keeps track of the
progress and decides to terminate the generation once no new states are found. We
here omit the code of the manager process as it has no interactions with the POR
pruning part. See, e.g., [12] for a generic speciﬁcation of the manager process.
In algorithm 2, we have included standard constructs for distributed state space
generation: each client has a unique identity ID, and is provided with a hash function
h that assigns to each state a unique “owner” client which is responsible for its
expansion. The procedure SendToClientsNextLevel(S), with S being a set of states,
sends the states of S to their corresponding owners (determined by h). Conversely,
the procedure S := ReceiveFromClientsNextLevel() receives from all clients the
states that are to be processed by the current client and returns them in the set S.
The procedures RecvFromMgr () and SendToMgrNewStatesFound (ID, | S |> 0) are
used to communicate with the manager. The procedure RecvFromMgr () asks the
manager if the client should continue the search and SendToMgrNewStatesFound
reports to the manager whether any new states have been found in the current
round.
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Algorithm 2 DPOR for security protocols
Requires: ID , h : Σ → {IDs}
Expanded := ∅; Current := ∅
if h(s0) = ID then
Current := {s0}
end if
repeat
Next := ∅
for all s ∈ Current \ Expanded do
Construct en(s)/∼ and name its elements as c1, . . . , c.
T := {ci | i ∈ {1, . . . , },V(ci) ∪ R(ci) = ∅}
if T = ∅ then
Pick the smallest c ∈ T
Next := Next ∪ nxt(s, c)
else if T = ∅ then
Next := Next ∪ nxt(s, en(s))
end if
end for
SendToMgrNewStatesFound (ID, | Next |> 0)
command := RecvFromMgr ()
if command = ﬁnish then
SendToClientsNextLevel (Next)
Expanded := Expanded ∪ Current
Current := ReceiveFromClientsNextLevel ()
end if
until command = ﬁnish
5 Experimental results
This section reports some experimental results using an implementation of DPOR,
explained in section 4, in the distributed μCRL toolset (e.g. [1,2]).
To demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the proposed POR algorithm we have mod-
elled a Digital Rights Management (DRM) protocol, described in detail in [11].
Below, we shortly describe this protocol and our experimental results.
The protocol of [11] comprises a ﬁnite set of trusted content rendering devices C
and a ﬁnite set of trusted entities T. The goal of the protocol is to provide a secure
environment for fair exchange of digital items among the members of C, in presence
of malicious players. In case of a malicious act, the suﬀered party resorts to one of
the trusted entities. The set D contains the items available in the protocol. Each
item is bundled with a right declaring the terms of use of that particular item. The
set of rights is denoted R. To keep the state space ﬁnite, each c ∈ C only has access
to a ﬁnite set of fresh nonces Nc to start new sessions. Below we consider |C| = 2
and |D| = |R| = 1.
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Table 1
Eﬀectiveness of DPOR. (Time is in min:sec format.)
Instance Exhaustive DPOR Reduction
|Nc| |T| # States Time # States Time in # States in Time
1 2 89,155 02:27.74 45,871 01:56.49 48.5% 21.2%
2 2 277,459 06:23.82 145,559 05:21.97 47.5% 16.1%
1 3 2,674,940 52:47.48 1,082,122 34:09.28 59.5% 35.3%
2 3 11,896,384 269:08.64 4,794,745 169:40.64 59.7% 36.9%
5.1 Experiment setting
In all our experiments, we use machines with a single 64 bit Athlon 2.2 GHz CPU
and 1 GB RAM, running Fedora Core 6 Linux, connected with Gigabit Ethernet
(1Gbps). In the following, measured “time” refers to elapsed time (wall clock time),
that is the time taken from the beginning till the end of an experiment. Therefore,
this is not only computation time, but also reﬂects periods of waiting, etc. The
experiments were performed using the μCRL toolset version 2.17.13.
5.2 Eﬀectiveness of DPOR
In this section, we discuss the eﬀectiveness of our DPOR algorithm by comparing
the number of states and generation time when using the DPOR algorithm versus
using exhaustive distributed breadth-ﬁrst state space generation (both implemented
in the μCRL toolset). In table 1, we consider four instances of the DRM protocol
described above. The number of fresh nonces available to each rendering device is
denoted by |Nc|, and |T| denotes the number of concurrent trusted party processes.
The time column shows the amount of time (in min:sec) required by 16 machines to
complete the generation task. It is worth mentioning that next-state generation is
in general relatively slow in security protocols, as it involves matching the messages
that protocol participants can receive with the messages that the attacker process
can construct.
In table 1, we observe that approximately a 50% reduction in the number of
states is achieved. Although DPOR loads the generation algorithm with some
book-keeping and extra computations, the gained reduction deﬁnitely compensates
for these costs, as is evident from the time columns.
5.3 Scalability of DPOR
In table 2, we compare the generation time required by DPOR using diﬀerent num-
bers of machines. As was explained earlier, since the DPOR algorithm does not
require extra communications to synchronise on the POR pruning part, we expect
it to scale up well. Figure 1 shows the results of this table on log-scale graphs.
These measurements indeed conﬁrm that DPOR exhibits reasonable scalability.
A phenomenon that can be observed in the case of (|Nc|, |T|) = (2, 3), is that the
speed-up factor 2 for 8 and 16 machines experiments are absurdly high. Although
2 We adopt the following deﬁnition of speed-up factor: t1
tn
, where t1 is the time required by one machine
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Table 2
Scalability of DPOR.










Instance
# Machines
1 4 8 16
|Nc| |T| Time Time Time Time
1 2 11:56.44 04:45.27 03:16.72 01:56.49
2 2 43:14.15 15:54.48 10:15.75 05:21.97
1 3 374:33.38 123:44.43 71:45.94 34:09.28
2 3 2676:34.70 1286:15:36 356:18.81 168:05.45
reasoning based on speed-up factor has many defects, e.g. see [6], nonetheless, we
ﬁnd it illuminating to discuss why this behaviour occurs.
Through the experiments on the (2,3) case, we witnessed that when using 1
and 4 machines, the available RAM of the machines is not enough, and therefore
the operating system starts swapping, i.e. using high-latency disk memory besides
RAM. Therefore, these experiments take much more time than expected. For
instance, the reduced state space of the (2,3) case is roughly 5 times larger than
the reduced state space of the case (1,3), see table 1, whereas table 2 shows that
when using 1 and 4 machines, the (2,3) case is about nine times slower than the
case (1,3). This is because of the time penalty that is imposed by swapping.
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Fig. 1. Elapsed time in DPOR
6 Future and related work
Future work We consider experimenting with various classes of security proto-
cols to assess the eﬀectiveness of DPOR in diﬀerent settings.
Related work When it comes to distributed POR, a major issue is to ﬁnd an
eﬃcient way to satisfy the cycle condition, see, e.g., [5]. Notable papers which
to perform the generation using the parallel algorithm, and tn is the time required by n parallel machines
to perform the same job.
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tackle this problem in the distributed setting are [4,10]. Our work is in some sense
orthogonal to these papers, as the cycle condition is irrelevant in cycle-free state
spaces, which is our framework. In contrast, we propose an algorithm to eﬃciently
ﬁnd a suitable subset of en(s) to be explored at each state s, with solely local
inspections.
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